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Abstract 
This paper focuses on Information Warfare – the warfare characterised by the use of 
information and communication technologies. This is a fast growing phenomenon, 
which poses a number of issues ranging from the military use of such technologies to 
its political and ethical implications. The paper presents a conceptual analysis of this 
phenomenon with the goal of investigating its nature. Such an analysis is deemed to 
be necessary in order to lay the groundwork for future investigations into this topic, 
addressing the ethical problems engendered by this kind of warfare. The conceptual 
analysis is developed in three parts. First, it delineates the relation between 
Informational Warfare and the Information revolution. It then focuses attention on the 
effects that the diffusion of this phenomenon has on the concepts of state and war. On 
the basis of this analysis, a definition of Information Warfare is provided as a 
phenomenon not necessarily sanguinary and violent, and rather transversal 
concerning the environment in which it is waged, the way it is waged and the 
ontological and social status of its agents. The paper concludes by taking into 
consideration Just War Theory and the problems arising from its application to the 
case of Informational Warfare.  
Key words: Cyber Attack; Information Revolution; Information Warfare; Robotic 
Weapon; Just War Theory; War. 
1. Introduction 
The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in warfare scenarios 
has been of central interest to governments, intelligence agencies, computer scientists 
and security experts for the past two decades (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997; Campen 
and Dearth 1998; Singer 2009). ICTs support war-waging in two ways: providing new 
weapons to be deployed on the battlefield – like drones and semi-autonomous robots 
used to hit ground targets, defuse bombs and patrolling actions - and allowing for the 
so-called information superiority, the ability to collect, process, and disseminate 
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information while exploiting or denying the adversary’s ability to do the same.  
 ICTs prove to be effective and advantageous war technologies, as they are 
efficient and relatively cheap when compared to the general costs of traditional 
warfare (Arquilla and Borer 2007; Steinhoff 2007b; Brenner 2008). For this reason, 
the use of ICTs in warfare has grown rapidly in the last decade determining some 
deep changes in the way war is waged. ICTs gave rise to the latest revolution in 
military affairs (RMA)1 by providing new tools and processes of waging war - like 
network-centric warfare (NCW), and integrated command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).  
This RMA concerns in primis military forces, as they have to deal with “the 
5th dimension of warfare, information, in addition to land, sea, air and space” 
[emphasis added].2 It also concerns strategy planners, policy-makers and ethicists, as 
rules for this new form of warfare are much needed and the existing international 
regulations, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions, provide only partial guidelines 
(Wall 2000; Barnett 1998; Saydjari et al. 2002). In the same way, traditional ethical 
theories of war, which should provide the framework for policies and regulations, 
struggle to address the ethical problems that arise with this new form of warfare 
(Arquilla 1999; DeGeorge 2003; Powers 2004; Weber 2009).  
In particular there are three categories of problems on which both policy-
makers and ethicists focus their attention, and these are the risks, rights and 
responsibilities. In the rest of this paper I shall refer to these problems as the 3R 
problems. ICT-based modes of conflicts do not relate exclusively to military affairs. 
Rather, they represent a wide spectrum phenomenon, which is rapidly changing the 
dynamics of combat as well as the role warfare plays in political negotiations and the 
dynamics of civil society. These changes are the origins of the 3R problems, so the 
conceptual analysis of such changes and of the nature of this phenomenon is deemed 
to be a necessary and preliminary step for addressing these problems.  
Altogether, the 3R problems pose a new ethical challenge with which most of 
the extant literature on the use of ICTs in warfare is concerned. Nevertheless, the 3R 
problems will not be the focus of this paper, which will instead concentrate on the 
analysis of the nature of ICTs-based warfare. The task of the proposed analysis is to 
                                                
1 For an analysis of RMA considering both the history of such revolutions and the effects of the 
development of the most recent technologies on warfare see (Benbow 2004; Blackmore 2005). 
2 http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/military.htm 
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lay down the conceptual foundation for the solution of the 3R problems, which will be 
provided elsewhere.  
In the rest of this paper ICTs-based warfare will be analysed within the 
framework of the Information revolution (Floridi 2009). In particular, a general 
definition of this kind of warfare will be provided as a starting point of the analysis. 
Then it will be argued that this form of warfare is one of the most compelling cases of 
the shift toward the non-physical domain brought to the fore by the Information 
revolution. Attention will be focused upon the effects of such a shift on the concept of 
war and upon a structural aspect of contemporary society, such as the distinction 
between civil society and military organisations. Finally, the paper will focus on Just 
War Theory and its application to the case of ICTs-based warfare.  
Before analysing in detail the nature of this new form of warfare, I will 
describe concisely the 3R problems. The examination of these problems is not the 
goal of this analysis, but since this paper is devoted to preparing the ground for their 
solution, the reader may benefit from being acquainted with them. 
Risks. The risks involved with ICTs-based warfare concern the potential 
increase in the number of conflicts and casualties. ICTs-based conflicts are virtually 
bloodless for the army that deploys them. This advantage has the drawback of making 
war less problematic for the force that can implement these technologies, and 
therefore making it easier not only for governments, but also for criminal or terrorist 
organisations, to engage in ICT-based conflicts around the world (Arquilla and Borer 
2007; Steinhoff 2007a; Brenner 2008).  
Rights. ICTs-based conflicts are pervasive for they not only target civilian 
infrastructures but may also be launched through civilian computers and websites. 
This may initiate a policy of higher levels of control enforced by governments in 
order to detect and defend their citizens from possible hidden forms of attacks. In this 
circumstance, the ethical rights of individual liberty, privacy and anonymity may 
come under sharp, devaluating pressure (Arquilla 1999; Denning 1999). 
Responsibilities. The problem concerns the assessment of responsibilities 
when using semi-autonomous robotic weapons and cyber attacks. In the case of 
robotic weapons, it is becoming increasingly unclear who, or what, is accountable and 
responsible for the actions performed by complex, hybrid, man-machine systems on 
the battlefield (Matthias 2004; Sparrow 2007). The assessment of responsibility 
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becomes an even more pressing issue in the case of cyber attacks, as it is potentially 
impossible to track back the author of such attacks (Denning 2007). 
We are now ready to look more carefully into the nature of ICTs-based 
warfare; this will be the task of the next section. 
2. Information Warfare and Information Revolution 
ICTs are used in several combat activities, from cyber attacks to the deployment of 
robotic weapons and the management of communications among the fighting units. 
Such a wide spectrum of uses makes it difficult to identify the peculiarities of this 
phenomenon. Help in respect to this will come from considering in more detail the 
different uses of ICTs in warfare. Let us begin by describing a very powerful kind of 
cyber attack, the ‘smurf’ attack. 
A smurf attack is an implementation of distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks. A DDoS is a cyber attack whose aim is to disrupt the functionality of a 
computer, a network or a website. In a smurf attack, the attacker sends a request for 
return packets to some intermediary network’s broadcast address, which in turn 
automatically communicates the request to all the peers on that network. All the peers 
then reply with a return packet. In the original packet, the author of the attack replaces 
her source address with the address of the intended victim. The victim is then flooded 
with replies from all the peers in the network. The author of the attack can send 
similar packets to other networks at the same time to intensify the attack and cause so 
much network congestion at the victim’s site that it will be impossible for the victim 
to perform any work or provide any services. This form of attack was deployed in 
2007 against institutional Estonian websites, and more recently similar attacks have 
been launched to block the Internet communication in Burma during the 2010 
elections.3  
The use of robotic weapons in the battlefield is another way to use ICTs in 
warfare. It is a growing phenomenon, coming to widespread public notice with US 
army, which deployed 150 robotic weapons in Iraq’s war in 2004, culminating in 
12,000 robots by 2008. Nowadays, several armies around the world are developing 
and using tele-operated robotic weapons, they have been deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and more sophisticated machines are being used at the borders between 
                                                
3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11693214 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm 
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Israel and Palestine in the so-called ‘automatic kill zone’. These robots are trusted to 
detect the presence of potential enemies and to mediate the action of the human 
soldiers and hence to fire on potential enemy’s targets when these are within the range 
patrolled by the robots.4 Several armies also invested their resources to deploy 
unmanned vehicles, like the MQ-1 predators, which have then been used to hit ground 
targets, and to develop unmanned combat air vehicles, which are designed to deliver 
weapons and can potentially act autonomously, like the EADS Barracuda, and the 
Northrop Grumman X-47B.5 One of the latest kinds of robotic weapon - SGR-A1 – 
has been deployed by South Korea to patrol the border with North Korea. 
This robot has low-light camera and pattern recognition software to 
distinguish humans from animals or other objects. It also has a colour camera, which 
can locate a target up to 500 metres, and if necessary, can fire its built-in machine gun. 
Up until now, robotic weapons were tele-operated by militaries sitting miles away 
from the combat zone. Human were kept in the loop and were the ones who decided 
whether to shoot the target and to manoeuvre the robot on the battlefield. The case of 
SGR-A1 constitutes quite a novelty, as it has an automatic mode, in which it can open 
fire on the given target without waiting for the human soldier to validate the operation.  
Finally, the management of communication among the units of an army has 
been revolutionized radically by the use of ICTs. Communication is a very important 
aspect of warfare. It concerns the analysis of the enemy’s resources and strategy and 
the definition of an army’s own tactics on the battlefield. NCW and C4ISR represent a 
major revolution in this respect. An example of such revolution is the use of iPhone 
and Android devices. Today, the US army is testing the use of these devices to access 
intelligence data, display videos made by drones flying over the battlefields, 
constantly update maps and information on tactics and strategy, and, generally 
speaking, gather all the necessary information to overwhelm the enemy.6 
 Before looking more carefully in the nature of Information Warfare (IW) it is 
worthwhile to recall the reader’s attention on the method of the analysis proposed in 
this article. In order to do so it is necessary to introduce the levels of abstractions 
                                                
4 http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/08/httpwwwnational.html 
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/06/for_years_and_y.html 
5 Note that MQ-1 Predators and EADS Barracuda, and the Northrop Grumman X-47B are Unmanned 
Combat Aerial Vehicles used for combat actions and they are different from Unmanned Air Vehicles, 
like for example Northrop Grumman MQ-8 Fire Scout, which are used for patrolling and recognition 
purposes only.  
6 http://www.geohot.us/2010/12/american-soldiers-are-testing-iphone.html 
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(LoAs) (Floridi 2008b).  
 A LoA is a finite but non-empty set of observables accompanied by a statement 
of what feature of the system is under consideration. A collection of LoAs constitutes 
an interface. An interface is used when analysing a system from various points of 
view, that is, at varying LoAs. For example, a glass of wine observed at a chemical 
LoA consists of the observables of the chemical processes on going in liquid, while 
the same glass of wine being observed at the LoA of drinker might be identified by 
the observables that represent its taste and bouquet. A single LoA does not reduce a 
glass of wine to merely its on-going chemical processes or to its taste and bouquet. 
Rather, it is a tool that males explicit the observation perspective and restricts it to 
only those elements that are relevant in a given observation. LoAs are hierarchically 
organized; a high LoA enables a general perspective and allows for a general analysis 
of the observed system. A low LoA provides a less general perspective and allows for 
a more detailed analysis.  
The goal is to analyse the nature of IW as a phenomenon; in order to do so the 
different occurrences of such a phenomenon, i.e. the deployment of robotic weapons, 
cyber attacks and the use of ICTs for communication management, are all considered 
at a high LoA. At such a level, the different occurrences of military uses of ICTs are 
considered only with respect to their common factor rather than their differences. The 
analysis developed in this way allows for focusing on the nature of IW and for 
unveiling its characteristic aspects. Once these aspects are considered, a lower LoA 
will be endorsed in order to study the specific occurrences of IW and their ethical 
implications. 
Despite the differences between the uses of ICTs in warfare, there is one 
aspect that is common to all the circumstances, and this is the deployment of ICTs 
with an immediate disruptive intent – be it the use of (semi)autonomous weapons, the 
disruption of some informational infrastructure or the deployment of digital devises to 
enhance the performance of the forces on the battlefield. This common factor 
provides the first step towards the definition of this new kind of warfare. We are now 
able to provide a general definition (GD). 
GD. Information Warfare is the use of ICTs with either offensive or 
defensive purpose to immediately intrude, disrupt, or control the opponent’s 
resources. 
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The expression Information Warfare is meant to stress the informational nature of this 
phenomenon. The label ‘information warfare’ has already been used in the extant 
literature to refer solely to the uses of ICTs devoted to breaching the opponent’s 
informational infrastructure in order to either disrupt it or acquire relevant data and 
information about the opponent’s resources, military strategies and so on, see for 
example (Libicki 1996; Waltz 1998; Schwartau 1994). In this paper, IW will be used 
to indicate a wide spectrum phenomenon with different occurrences – ranging from 
cyber attacks, to the use of (semi)autonomous weapons, NCW and C4ISR protocols – 
which all share the same informational nature, as they are all grounded on some 
implementation of ICTs (Figure 1). 
  
Figure 1 The deployment of robotic weapons, the launch of cyber attacks and the managing of communications 
through ICTs as instances of InformationWarfare.  
GD focuses only on the minimum common factor to all the occurrences of IW and it 
does not take into consideration other important features of this phenomenon. In 
particular, GD does not tell us whether there are other fundamental aspects of IW that 
need to be taken in consideration and what these are. Also, it does not allow for 
distinguishing between IW, information crime, terrorism or activism. For this reason, 
the reader should not consider it a conclusive definition but rather the starting point of 
our analysis, which will eventually allow for its refinement. 
Following GD, IW is yet another phenomenon occurring thanks to the 
dissemination of ICTs. In this respect, IW is in line with the diffusion of other 
phenomena such as e-commerce, social networks, e-trust, and e-governance. Like all 
these phenomena, IW is related to the so-called Information revolution, i.e. the 
development and capillary dissemination of ICTs. The reader should not mistake this 
approach as a way of trivialising the issue of IW; it is rather a way of considering IW 
within a broad perspective, with the idea that the nature of this phenomenon and its 
conceptual and ethical implications will become clearer, when considered in a wider 
framework. 
From an historical point of view, technological breakthroughs create economic 
upheavals, and determine changes affecting the structure of both civil society and 
military organisations. As described by (Toffler and Toffler 1997), this was the case 
in the Neolithic revolution, when human beings first made weapons out of wood and 
rocks, and in the Industrial revolution, which provided the means for industrialised 
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warfare and for the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. The Information 
revolution is the latest example. It has changed our activities in several ways and at 
several levels. The use of ICTs changed the way individuals manage their 
communications and daily practices, from working and reading books and listening to 
music, to shopping and driving. At a social level, ICTs reshaped social interactions 
with the dissemination of the social networks, like Facebook, Twitter, or Flickr for 
example. The same applies at the institutional level, where ICTs provide new tools for 
the management of information and bureaucracy (Saxena 2005; Ciborra 2005), and 
when considered with respect to the military activities, the Information revolution 
determines the latest revolution in military affairs.7 
 The Information revolution is a twofold phenomenon; it has both a 
technological and a philosophical nature. The technological breakthrough initiated a 
series of transformations affecting individual and social activities, which have 
philosophical consequences as they radically change the way human beings interact 
with their environment. Floridi stresses this aspect of the Information revolution when 
he calls it the fourth revolution (Floridi 2009), to highlight that - like the previous 
three revolutions, Darwinian, Copernican and Freudian – the Information revolution 
changes deeply the way human beings perceive themselves in the universe and 
interact with their environment.  
 Among the peculiarities of the Information revolution, one is of particular 
relevance when considering IW. This is that the Information revolution changes 
fundamentally the way reality is perceived and understood. In Floridi’s words: “[The 
Information revolution] is updating our everyday perspective on ourselves and on the 
ultimate nature of reality, that is, our metaphysics, from a materialist one, in which 
physical objects and processes play a key role, to an informational one. Objects and 
processes are increasingly seen as de-physicalised, in the sense that they tend to be 
treated as support-independent”, ([emphasis added] Floridi 2010, p.2).  
In the rest of this paper I will refer to such an updating process as a shift 
toward the non-physical domain. This shift makes the boundaries of reality stretch to 
include non-physical objects, actions and interactions as well as physical ones. IW is 
one of the most compelling instances of the shift toward the non-physical domain, for 
it shows that there is a new environment, where physical and non-physical entities 
                                                
7 See (Benbow 2004; Blackmore 2005) for an analysis of the debate on the on-going RMA. 
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coexist, in which states have to prove their authority and new modes of warfare are 
being developed specifically for deployment in such a new environment. Nowadays, 
the design of data banks and software, the ability to blindside the opponent’s 
informational infrastructures, and ensuring the superiority of informational 
infrastructures of a state, are as important as the superiority of weaponry and military 
force. This is the reason why in the last two decades, several states have devoted huge 
effort and resources in order to improve their informational infrastructures and to 
educate experts in the relevant fields.8  
There is no doubt about the fact that non-physical powers existed long before 
the advent of the Information revolution, economic and diplomatic powers being the 
most common examples. Yet, the novelty posed by the Information revolution is 
staggering, relying on the fact that informational (non-physical) powers are not 
backed up by physical powers but stand by themselves. Diplomatic power, for 
example, rests on the recognition of the military and industrial forces of a state. 
Informational powers, e.g. the ability to launch cyber attacks, on the contrary, are 
independent from any other power and, as IW shows, they may also provide the 
necessary support to make more effective a state’s physical powers.  
 The shift toward the non-physical domain affects the way war is waged. The 
issue arises as to whether the transformation imposed by this shift is reshaping the 
very concept of war. The analysis of this issue will be developed in the next section. 
3. War after IW 
War is understood as the use of a state’s violence through the state military forces to 
determine the conditions of governance over a determined territory (Gelven 1994). As 
Oppenheim put it: “war is a contention between two or more states through their 
armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such 
conditions of peace as the victor pleases”, (Lauterpacht 1952, p. 202). In this respect, 
the revolution determined by IW also has philosophical implications, beside the 
military and political ones, for the changes that it determines concern the very concept 
of war other than the way war is waged. 
                                                
8 The USA only spent $400 million in developing technologies for cyber conflicts: 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/05/cyberwar-cassandras-get-400-million-in-conflict-cash/ 
The UK devoted £650 million to the same purpose: 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1896098/british-military-spend-gbp650-million-cyber-
warfare   
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The choice to undertake a (classic) war usually involves a substantial 
commitment, as it has heavy economical and political costs, borne mainly by the civil 
society. These features of war have been radically changed by the advent of IW, 
which provides the means to carry out war in a completely different manner. In this 
scenario, the changes determined by IW are of astounding importance as they concern 
both the way the military and politicians consider waging war, and the way war is 
perceived in the civil society. Like traditional warfare, IW is very powerful and 
potentially highly disruptive. However, unlike traditional warfare, IW is potentially 
bloodless, cost effective, and is not a military specific phenomenon.  
Let us analyse these three aspects in greater detail. IW is virtually bloodless 
for the forces that deploy ICTs, as it does not require physical commitment. IW can 
be fought using tele-operated robots or launching a cyber attack, disrupting the 
enemy’s resources (both human and non-human) without risking any casualties for 
the army that deploys such technologies. IW is cost effective for two reasons; first, it 
increases the effectiveness of each fighting unit by providing powerful 
communication tools. C4ISR, for example, provides greater autonomy to the units on 
the battlefields and allows for establishing direct links in real time between strategic 
level and tactical level, reducing time and bureaucracy and, hence, costs. Second, the 
deployment of robotic weapons, like drones for example, and the use of cyber attacks 
are both much cheaper than using traditional aerial vehicles and attacks, and can be 
more efficient. Finally, the technologies and skills required to fight in an IW scenario 
are not military specific, as they are also largely used by civilians, and may be 
deployed by them for disruptive purposes.   
 It would be a mistake to consider IW simply as a non-sanguinary, cheap and 
less military-based version of classic warfare; IW can be as bloody and violent as 
traditional warfare, as it may determine damages and casualties comparable to 
traditional warfare. Nevertheless, the deployment of ICTs gives rise to a completely 
new form of warfare, whose main peculiarity is that of being transversal. IW is 
transversal with respect to the environment in which it can be waged, the kinds of 
agents involved in it, and the modes of combat. Such transversality represents the 
ultimate difference between IW and classic war, and it is the aspect of IW from which 
policy-related and ethical problems arise. 
Let us consider the environmental transversality of IW. In section two, it has 
been argued that with the Information revolution the environment in which we act is 
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extended to include both the physical and non-physical domains. IW may originate in 
and affect both domains. The case of Stuxnet will help to clarify this aspect. Stuxnet 
is a computer-worm, first discovered in Belarus in 2010. It became famous during the 
same year for being tracked in the Iranian nuclear power plant of Bushehr, damaging 
a number of centrifuges.9 This computer-worm targets systems that are not connected 
to the Internet, like the industrial ones. The worm is spread via USB key and infects 
Windows systems. Once it has infected a machine, it seeks a specific configuration of 
industrial control software. Once hijacked, the code can reprogram the programmable 
logic control software and controls the infected industrial machinery. In this way it is 
possible, for example, to turn on and off motors, in the case of the centrifuges to 
manipulate temperature and turn on coolers. The disruptive potential that originates 
from this computer-worm is quite high. 
The case of Stuxnet provides a good example of the environmental 
transversality of IW, as it is a digital (non-physical) weapon able to affect, and 
possibly disrupt, objects in the physical domain. It illustrates how attacks originating 
in cyberspace, like a worm, may quite easily affect physical objects or individuals, 
and that IW can easily be used for this purpose, and not only to disrupt informational 
targets.  
 The transversality of IW also has a bearing on the kind of agents involved in 
the warfare scenario. In this respect, two issues need to be highlighted: the ontological 
and the social status of the combatants. The ontological status ranges over a quite 
large spectrum, as combat actions undertaken under the umbrella of IW are performed 
both by artificial agents, such as viruses, drones and robots for example, and human 
agents. The heterogeneous nature of combating agents is an important aspect to 
consider, for it poses policy-related and ethical issues. In relation to policy, the 
questions concern how to deploy and cause interaction between different kinds of 
agents in a warfare scenario. Typical problems are, for example, the definition of the 
chain of command and the rules of engagement. When it comes to ethics, the issues 
become even more pressing, because they concern the ethical responsibility of the 
actions performed by these agents. In IW artificial agents, such as drones, robots and 
viruses, and human agents may have the same role in achieving a given goal, their 
actions are equally relevant and important, despite their ontological differences. 
                                                
9 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/29/world/main7100197.shtml 
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Therefore it is of paramount importance to define criteria for establishing the 
responsibilities in combat actions. 
 The transversality of IW with respect to the social status of the combatants 
follows from the fact that IW does not require military-specific skills and techniques. 
This aspect has the side effect of allowing skilful civilians to participate in combat 
actions in IW, for example launching a virus or a DDoS attack. Beside the image of 
the nerd guy sitting in his room and blowing up a far distant nuclear power plant, this 
aspect of IW has an important consequence for contemporary society, as it leads to 
the blurring of the distinction between civil society and military organisation. 
The tasks, the skills and the roles, peculiar to the two sectors of society are 
being completely redefined. In the past, the relation between civil society and military 
organisations (CMR) were grounded on the normative assumption that civilians’ 
control of the military is preferable to the military’s control of the civil infrastructures 
(Burk 2002; Huntington 1957). The principal problem to solve was to explain how 
civilian control over the military should be established and maintained. This 
framework is being eroded by the dynamics developed within IW, and new issues are 
now emerging such as whether it is acceptable from an ethical and political 
perspective to allow the distinction to vanish.  
This blurring of boundaries may eventually lead to holding civilians 
responsible for combat actions and to consider civilian public and private 
infrastructure licit targets in warfare scenarios. So, for example, it may become 
acceptable to disrupt the civilian supply chain for food and water and to control 
civilians’ private networks and computers. 
 Finally, the transversality of modes of combat in IW concerns the wide range 
of techniques that can be deployed, from C4ISR to DDoS or informational viruses, to 
drones and robots. It also concerns the level of violence of combat actions in IW, 
which range from ‘soft’ non-violent actions, such as DDoS attacks, to extremely 
disruptive and violent attacks, as could be the case of a robotic weapon taking part in 
an action on the battlefield or a cyber attack that leads to the casualties and physical 
damage. The transversality here has important consequences. The most important one 
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is that IW can be unequivocally defined neither as a violent nor as a ‘soft’ form of 
warfare.10 
 The analysis presented in this section allows us to refine the definition of IW 
provided in section two. IW refined definition (RD) is: 
RD. Information Warfare is the use of ICTs within an offensive or 
defensive military strategy endorsed by a state and aiming at the immediate 
disruption or control of the enemy’s resources, and which is waged within 
the informational environment, with agents and targets ranging both on the 
physical and non-physical domains and whose level of violence may vary 
upon circumstances. 
Note that RD refines the definition of IW provided in section 2 allowing for 
distinguishing the cases of IW from those of information-activism, crime and 
terrorism, as it refers to IW as being a state’s activity performed through a state’s 
military forces, whereas information-activism, crime and terrorism involve non-state 
actors.  
With this definition of IW in place, we are now ready to turn our attention to 
the analysis of the application of Just War Theory to the case of IW. 
4. Just War Theory and IW 
Ethical analyses of war are developed following three main paradigms: Just War 
Theory, Pacifism or Realism. In the rest of this paper, the analysis will focus only on 
Just War Theory. This theory is the most influential of the three ethical frameworks, 
providing the ground for international regulations, such as the United Nations Charter 
and The Hague and Geneva Conventions, and setting the parameters for both the 
ethical and the political debates. Therefore it is of paramount importance to 
understand whether and how the principles of this theory could be applied to the case 
of IW (Arquilla 1998).   
 Just War Theory prescribes the principle for states and their political leaders to 
declare, wage and terminate just war. It refers to a classic scenario where war is meant 
to be a violent and sanguinary phenomenon, declared by states and their official 
leaders and waged by military forces. Such a scenario is quite different from the one 
determined by IW. Yet, before throwing the baby out with the bathwater, it is worth 
                                                
10 See (Wingfield 2000) for a description of the criteria to assess the whether a war action uses 
economic, diplomatic forces, and other soft measures. 
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considering whether, despite the differences between classic war and IW, Just War 
Theory can be endorsed for the ethical analysis of IW. In order to do so, we need to 
understand where the problems lie, whether it is possible to solve them and, if so, how. 
In the rest of this paper, attention will focus on the identification of the problems, 
their solution has been left to another paper.  
 The first problem has already been partially described in this section - this is 
that Just War Theory refers to classic warfare scenario. It assumes that governments 
and their leaders are the only ones who inaugurate wars, by deploying their armed 
forces, and they are the ones to be held accountable for the actions of war. IW 
changed this scenario, by fostering a completely new way of declaring and waging 
war. Just War Theory needs to take into account such changes in order to address the 
ethical problems that arise with IW. IW has to be considered not simply as a new way 
of waging war, but as a new phenomenon, which engenders radical changes on the 
modes of conflicts and on the concept of war.  
The need to consider IW as a completely different phenomenon from classic 
warfare, and to take into consideration such difference, becomes evident when 
considering Just War Theory in more detail. In this respect, there are two problems 
that deserve attention; they follow from the application of the principles of ‘war as 
last resort’ and the one of ‘discrimination’ to the IW scenario. 
 The principle of war as last resort prescribes that a state may resort to war only 
if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolve the conflict in 
question, in particular diplomatic negotiations. This principle rests on the assumption 
that war is a violent and sanguinary phenomenon and as such it has to be avoided 
until it remains the only reasonable way for a state to defend itself. The application of 
this principle is shaken when IW is taken in consideration, because in this case war 
may be bloodless and may not involve physical violence at all. In these circumstances, 
the use of the principle of war as last resort becomes less immediate.11 
Imagine, for example, the case of tense relations between two states and that 
the tension could be resolved if one of the states decide to launch a cyber attack on the 
other state’s informational infrastructure. The attack would be bloodless as it would 
                                                
11 Note that the problems related to the application of the principle of last resort are not a direct 
consequence of the informational nature of the possible strike, rather they follow from the fact that 
cyber attacks may be bloodless. In this respect, the application of the principle becomes problematic in 
any case where a bloodless first strike could be used to avoid a sanguinary war, independently from the 
nature of such a strike. 
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affect only the informational grid of the other state and there would be not casualties. 
The attack could also lead to resolution of the tension and avoid the possibility of a 
traditional war in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, according to Just War Theory, 
the attack would be an act of war, and as such it is forbidden as a first strike move. 
The impasse is quite dramatic, for if the state decides not to launch the cyber attack it 
will be probably forced to engage in a sanguinary war in the future, but if the state 
authorises the cyber attack it will breach the principle of war as last resort and commit 
an unethical action, which could probably be sanctioned by international regulations.  
 This example is emblematic of the problems encountered in the attempt to 
establish ethical guidelines for IW. In this case, the main problem is due to the 
transversality of the modes of combat described in section three, which make it 
difficult to define unequivocal ethical guidelines. In the light of the principle of last 
resort, soft and non-violent cases of IW can be approved as means for avoiding 
traditional war (Perry 1995), as they can be considered a viable alternative to 
bloodshed. At the same time, even the soft cases of IW have a disruptive purpose - 
disrupting the enemy’s (informational) resources (Floridi 2008a) - which need to be 
taken in consideration. There are means that can be justly endorsed proactively to 
avoid classic warfare and soft-cases of IW may be among these means (Bok 1978). 
Nevertheless, the disruptive intent, even when it is not achieved through violent and 
sanguinary means, must be taken in consideration by any analysis aiming at providing 
ethical guidelines for IW. 
It is worthwhile noticing that the problem engendered by the application of the 
principle of last resort to the soft-cases of IW may also be addressed by stressing that 
these cases do not fall within the scope of Just War Theory as they may be considered 
cases of espionage rather than cases of war, and as such they do not represent a ‘first 
strike’ and the principle of last resort should not be applied to them. 
One consequence of this approach is that Just War Theory would address war 
scenarios by focusing on traditional cases of warfare, such as physical attacks, and on 
the deployment of robotic weapons, disregarding the use of cyber attacks. This would 
be quite a problematic consequence because, despite the academic distinction between 
IW and traditional warfare, the two phenomena are actually not so distinct in reality. 
Robotic weapons fight on the battlefield side by side with human soldiers, and 
military strategies comprise both physical and cyber attacks. By disregarding cyber 
attacks, Just War Theory would only be able to address partially contemporary 
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warfare, while it should take into consideration the whole range of phenomena related 
to war waging in order to address the ethical issues posed by it. 
The other consequence is that this approach unveils the need of a flexible 
framework when considering contemporary war waging. Cyber attacks can be 
deployed in different circumstances and with different goals, see for example the use 
of Suter in the Operation Orchard12 and the ‘cap cake attack’.13 In the first case the 
cyber attack was part of the military action and should be considered an act of war, in 
the second case it was a pure act of espionage. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of the 
possible uses of cyber attacks should not lead to exclude them from the ethical 
analysis of IW, it rather shows the need to develop a framework for the analysis of 
this new kind of warfare able to account for such heterogeneity. 
 The second problem concerns the principle of discrimination and non-
combatant immunity. This principle, like the principle of war as last resort, refers to a 
classic war scenario and aims at reducing the bloodshed and prohibits any form of 
violence against non-combatants, like civilians. It is part of the jus in bello criteria 
and states that soldiers can use their weapons to target exclusively those who are 
“engaged in harm” (Walzer 2000, p. 82). Casualties inflicted on non-combatants are 
excused only if they are a consequence of a non-deliberate act. This principle is of 
paramount importance, as it prevents massacres of individuals not actively involved 
in the conflict. Its correctness is not questionable yet its application is quite difficult in 
the context of IW.  
 In classic warfare, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
reflects the distinction between military and civil society. Hence it forbids targeting 
not only civilians but also civilian infrastructures, like hospitals or food and water 
supply chains. In the last century, the diffusion of terrorism and guerrilla warfare 
weakened the association between non-combatants and civilians. In the case of IW 
such association becomes even feebler, due to the blurring between civil society and 
military organisations (Schmitt 1999; Shulman 1999). As noted in section three, IW 
does not require military expertise; civilians can easily undertake a war action. The 
                                                
12 In 2007 Israel launched Operation Orchard and carried out an airstrike on Syria. It has been 
speculated that the Israeli army may have used a computer program, Suter, to interfere with the Syrian 
air defense system in order for Israeli planes to pass undetected by the Syrian radar. 
13 The ‘cup cake attack’ was launched by MI6 against Al Qaeda on-line magazine in June 2011. In this 
case the instructions on how to ‘Make a bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom’ where changed into the 
recipes of ‘The Best Cupcakes in America’. http://idle.slashdot.org/story/11/06/03/1346209/MI6-
Swaps-Bomb-Making-Info-With-Cupcake-Recipe-On-al-Qaeda-Website 
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blurring leads to the involvement of civilians in war actions and poses two issues. The 
first one concerns the discrimination itself: in the IW scenario it is difficult to 
distinguish combatants from non-combatants, wearing a uniform is no longer a 
sufficient criterion to identify someone’s status. Civilians may take part in a combat 
action from the comfort of their homes, while carrying on with their civilian life and 
hiding their status as informational warriors. 
The second problem concerns the effects of this difficulty in distinguishing 
combatants from non-combatants and unveils an ethical conundrum. If combatants 
can easily hide themselves among the civilian population, then states may be justified 
in endorsing high levels of surveillance over the entire population, thereby breaching 
individual rights, like privacy and anonymity, in order to identify the combatants and 
guarantee the security of the entire community.14 For the sake of these goals, public 
authorities could also be justified in persecuting certain sections of the civilian 
population, which are profiled and deemed to be potentially dangerous for the 
community. Therefore, on the one side respecting the principle of discrimination may 
lead to the violation of individual rights. On the other side, waiving the principle of 
discrimination leads to bloodshed and dissemination of violence over the entire civil 
population, because the policy could be endorsed to target everyone or everything a 
soldier encounters in her way, as being potentially involved in the conflict. 
 These problems highlight the pressing need to provide an ethical framework 
for the regulation of IW. Such regulation needs to be accepted by states and 
international organisations and to be consistent with the existing ones regarding 
classic warfare; for this reason, applying Just War Theory to IW is of major 
importance.  
5. Conclusion 
IW represents a staggering revolution, which concerns military affairs and has also 
political and social ramifications for contemporary society. Such a radical revolution 
leaves a vacuum for both ethical principles and regulations. Ethical guidelines are 
deemed to be the grounds on which any regulation of IW stands, and for this reason 
most of the extant literature focuses on the ethical analysis of this form of warfare 
(Schwartau 1996; Nitzberg 1998).  
                                                
14 This problem is part of the 3R problems described in section one. 
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 This paper proposed to take a step back in the analysis of IW, and to focus 
first on the nature of this phenomenon and then to turn attention on its ethical 
implications, for which the conceptual analysis is meant to provide the groundwork.  
 Three aspects of IW have been highlighted in this paper, its relation to the 
Information revolution, and its disruptive and transversal nature. Considering IW in 
relation to the Information revolution unveiled a fundamental aspect of this 
phenomenon, that is, the shift toward the non-physical domain. It has been argued that 
IW represents one of the most compelling cases of such shift, as it shows that political 
and militaries authorities are investing their resources to establish and maintain power 
over such domain.  
 This analysis leads to the consideration of the effects of the dissemination of 
IW on the concept of war, and showed that this new form of conflict imposes radical 
changes on the way war is waged and conceived. In particular, IW redefines the 
concept of war as a phenomenon not necessarily sanguinary and violent, but rather 
transversal in the way in which it concerns the environment in which it is waged, the 
way it is waged and the ontological and social status of its agents. 
 Finally, Just War Theory and the problems arising from its application to IW 
have been taken in consideration. The analysis of such problems indicates that in 
order to endorse the principles of Just War Theory to analyse IW, it is necessary to 
extend the set of the assumptions concerning war scenario on which this theory rests 
to include the peculiarities of IW scenario.  
 The analysis presented in this paper examines the nature of IW, and highlights 
the problems generated by this phenomenon, be they ethical, social or purely 
philosophical. With such an analysis in place, attention will now be devoted to 
defining an ethical framework for IW. This task has been left to a future work. 
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